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1.0 PURPOSE 
This paper addresses deficiencies identified with the Performance Assessment (PA) for Greater 
Confinement Disposal (GCD) Boreholes compliance with the Title 40 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) Part 191.14, “Assurance Requirements” (CFR, 1985).  The Transuranic 
Waste Disposal Federal Review Group (TFRG), and U.S. Department of Energy Headquarters 
(DOE/HQ), need to concur that the assurance requirements have been met at the time of closure 
of the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS). 
2.0 BACKGROUND 
The GCD Boreholes are located within the southeast quadrant (the 92-Acre Area) of the Area 5 
RWMS of the Nevada Test Site (NTS).  Four of the GCD boreholes contain mixed transuranic 
(MTRU) and transuranic (TRU) classified material.  
 
The MTRU and TRU disposal units must meet the regulatory requirements of Title 40 CFR Part 
191, “Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent 
Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes,” under DOE self-regulation as 
specified in DOE Order 435.1.  The §191.14 Assurance Requirements provide increased 
confidence that long-term compliance with the containment requirements in §191.13 will be 
achieved.  The PAs for TRU waste disposal facilities must show that the containment 
requirements are likely to be met for 10,000 years.  Overlapping measures mitigate potential 
inadvertent disturbance of the waste and reduce potential exposures and releases to the 
environment. 
 
Sandia National Laboratories prepared a “Performance Assessment for the GCD TRU 
Boreholes” (Cochran et al., 2001).  In 2002, the TFRG determined that Volume 4:  Application of 
the Assurance Requirements, Version 1.1, July 21, 2000, did not meet 40 CFR 191.14 assurance 
requirements for: institutional controls; a monitoring program; markers, records, and other 
passive institutional controls; an engineered barrier system; information to support the claim that 
there are no economically useful minerals in the area; and removal of waste.  The 
U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office 
(NNSA/NSO) committed to resolve these issues during the closure planning process for the 
Area 5 RWMS (Colarusso et al., 2003) and that the TFRG would review closure and post-
closure documents to determine compliance with the 1993 version of Title 40 CFR 191 (Fiore 
and Berube, 2002).  The 1993 version has more restrictive individual protection requirements 
and groundwater protection standards than the 1985 version, and it uses dosimetric standards 
consistent with U.S. radiation exposure regulations. 
 
This paper provides the general strategy for meeting the assurance requirements.  Detailed 
compliance measures will be incorporated into the Closure and Post-Closure Care Plan for the 
GCD boreholes. 
 
The design for the final cover for the disposal units in the 92-Acre Area and a draft of the 
Closure Plan are in development.  Approval of the assurance requirements compliance strategy 
by TFRG and DOE/HQ will help NNSA/NSO maintain the PA/Composite Analysis (CA) 
revision and closure schedule, as the results of the PAs must be incorporated into the final 
closure plans.   
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3.0 OVERVIEW 
There are six assurance requirements topics to be addressed:  
 
• Passive institutional controls (PICs) 
• Active institutional controls 
• Monitoring plan 
• Economic resource assessment 
• TRU waste retrieval plan 
• Engineered and natural barriers to isolate the waste 
 
Passive institutional controls, active institutional controls, and monitoring are interrelated 
components of post-closure care planning.  Some of the details of these provisions may be 
refined further during post-closure care plan development.  The distinction between passive and 
active institutional controls varies by institution, regulatory agency, and publication.   U.S> 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory definitions are used here.  The institutional 
control strategy outlined in this paper is consistent with the Federal Facility Agreement and 
Consent Order (FFACO) between the state of Nevada, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) (FFACO, 1996) Underground Test Area (UGTA) Corrective 
Action Unit (CAU) approach.  The FFACO is a multi-agency agreement detailing how certain 
corrective action sites in Nevada will be investigated and remediated. 
 
The Area 5 RWMS is located far from significant economic resources that may attract human 
intrusions, important water supplies, and sensitive and unique habitats.  This paper identifies 
some of the detailed economic resource assessments and waste retrieval plans that have been 
prepared for the Area 5 RWMS.  A few key points of the economic resource assessments are 
summarized. 
 
Since 1992, the NNSA/NSO has maintained a waste retrieval plan in accordance with 40 CFR 
191.  The latest update was prepared in 2007 (DOE, 2007). 
 
The strategy for meeting the engineered barrier assurance requirement assumes the best choice is 
the most cost-effective barrier that complies with the regulation.  The effectiveness of the site 
setting as a natural barrier has been detailed in the PAs and CAs for the Area 5 RWMS.  National 
Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), and the NNSA/NSO, recently evaluated engineered 
barrier options for Trench T04C, a shallow trench containing low level waste and TRU, which is 
within approximately 150 meters (m) (492 feet [ft]) of the GCD borings containing TRU.  The 
results of the special assessment and modeling are expected to be available for DOE/HQ review 
by the end of fiscal year 2007.  Because the site conditions are similar, some of the findings from 
the T04C assessment are applicable to the GCD boreholes.  Recent evolution of the institutional 
control strategy may result in further optimization of the closure cover design, which may impact 
the final engineered barrier compliance choice.  
4.0 PASSIVE INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS 
40 CFR 191.14(c):  Disposal sites shall be designated by the most permanent markers, records, 
and other passive institutional controls practicable to indicate the dangers of the wastes and 
their location.  
 
In 40 CFR 191.12, “Definitions” a PIC is defined as “(1) permanent markers placed at a disposal 
site; (2) public records and archives; (3) government ownership and regulations regarding land 
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and resource use; and (4) other methods of preserving knowledge about the location, design, and 
contents of a disposal system.”  Physical barriers and conditions that control access to a site or 
disposal unit are also sometimes identified as another form of PIC.  Inspection and maintenance 
of passive structures and markers is an active control. 
 
Many of the PICs are meant to remain in place beyond the active institutional control period.  
These controls may reduce, but not eliminate, the likelihood of inadvertent human intrusion.  
Performance evaluations may take credit for PICs.  However, the GCD PA took no credit for 
PICs in deterring intrusion into the boreholes.  The following PICs are being considered for the 
GCD facility: 
 
• Boundary monuments and signs 
• Records distributed to national and international archives 
• Records submitted to record centers locally, nationally, and internationally 
• Government control and land-use restrictions 
• Other means of communication in references, books, maps, and atlases 
• Natural and engineered barriers. 
 
NNSA/NSO has reviewed land-use restrictions and institutional control policies across 
environmental protection programs to improve consistency in assessment of human intrusion and 
public exposure scenarios.  PICs can be implemented at closure and/or during the active 
institutional control period. 
4.1      Monuments and Signs 
Monuments will be selected, sited, and installed with consideration of maximizing potential 
endurance. 
 
Many of the operationally closed landfill cells in the 92-Acre Area are currently marked by 
concrete monuments.  Some monuments are labeled with plates.  Many of the monuments are 
likely to be buried or disturbed in the course of constructing the final cover over the 92-Acre 
Area.  In addition to the final closure monuments, these buried monuments may also serve to 
warn future inadvertent excavators in the far future.  Inadvertent encounters with monuments and 
markers of the surrounding shallow landfill cells may discourage deeper excavation. 
 
Signs provide short-term protection.  The 92-Acre Area must meet posting requirements under 
several different regulations, programs, and permits (e.g., the Nevada Division of Environmental 
Protection [NDEP] solid waste permit for the asbestos landfill cell, future FFACO use restriction 
area for the CAU 111 shallow mixed waste trenches, NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual 
[Bechtel Nevada (BN), 2004]) posting requirements for underground radioactive material areas, 
etc.).  Passive controls in the Closure Plans will be accepted and approved by the various posting 
compliance entities. 
 
After construction of the final cover, in lieu of posting signs to warn of unit-specific hazards, the 
entire 92-Acre Area will be use-restricted, fenced, and posted on the boundary fence with signs 
every 30.5 m (100 ft).  The warning notices will indicate there is buried hazardous, radioactive, 
TRU, and asbestos waste, and provide contact information.  Such signs will be effective during 
the active institutional control period.  After active institutional control ends, and routine sign  
maintenance ends, the signs are not likely to remain intact and legible for more than a few years 
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because of weather damage.  Other monuments will provide longer-term indications of the extent 
of the buried waste area. 
4.2 Public Records 
Information on the 92-Acre Area, including the GCD boreholes, will be recorded in various 
public records maintained by several agencies and institutions.  Because the existence and 
location of the Area 5 RWMS will be documented in several different formats in multiple 
locations, the 92-Acre Area should be easy to locate well into the future. 
 
Some of the public records will include: 
 
• A Survey Plat of the closed 92-Acre Area, including the location and dimensions of regulated 
disposal units, will be submitted to NDEP prior to or with the Certification of Closure. 
 
• The FFACO use-restriction to be implemented for the adjacent CAU 111 mixed waste 
trenches will be recorded in the FFACO database and NTS Facility Information Management 
System database. 
 
More records will be detailed in the closure plans.  
4.3 Government Regulation of Land and Resource Use 
Government ownership, stewardship, and land-use controls are addressed in the active 
institutional controls section because they are most relevant to the period of active control. 
4.4 Control Effectiveness 
In Black et al. (2000), subject matter experts (SMEs) considered the long-term effectiveness of 
PICs to control intrusion.  Two distinct forms of controls were evaluated:  the ability to maintain 
site knowledge through oral or archival records, and the ability of placards and markers placed 
around the site to ward off potential inadvertent intruders and, hence, deter intrusion.   
 
The SMEs expected that site knowledge could be maintained indefinitely through formal means 
such as universities, libraries, local culture, oral history, and government agencies.  However, 
access to that knowledge was expected to decline as the time between major events at the NTS 
and the present increases.  The site knowledge resources were expected to be viable sources for 
many years after loss of active institutional control, provided institutional control was not lost 
through involuntary or abrupt means.  The SMEs agreed that there is a 50 percent chance that 
site knowledge will be lost within 100 years after the loss of institutional controls and a 
95 percent chance within 500 years.  The SMEs also evaluated the potential for placards and 
markers to effectively reduce the chance of future inadvertent human intrusion into the 
subsurface disposal units.  The primary factors identified by the SMEs for the potential 
effectiveness of placards and markers were their durability and interpretability over time.  The 
SMEs were uncertain about the ability for placards and markers to endure for 10,000 years, 
citing the potential for weathering or erosion, and vandalism, such as defacing, or theft.  
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5.0 ACTIVE INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS 
40 CFR 191.14 (a):  Active institutional controls over disposal sites should be maintained for as 
long a period of time as is practicable after disposal; however, performance assessments that 
assess isolation of the wastes from the accessible environment shall not consider any 
contributions from active institutional controls for more than 100 years after disposal. 
 
In 40 CFR 191, the EPA defines an active institutional control as “(1) controlling access to a 
disposal site by any means other than passive institutional control, (2) performing maintenance 
operations or remedial actions at a site, (3) controlling or cleaning up releases from a site, or 
(4) monitoring parameters related to disposal system performance.” 
 
Institutional controls are active measures taken at the DOE sites to limit radiation exposure to the 
public.  Active institutional controls include physical security programs that restrict public access 
to the sites; ensuring that radioactive materials and radiologically contaminated areas are 
properly identified, posted, and controlled; and administrative programs that ensure compliance 
with DOE orders and external agreements with other federal and state agencies and stakeholders.  
For the purpose of this discussion, the monitoring plan will be presented as a separate assurance 
item. 
 
Active institutional controls for the Area 5 RWMS include: 
 
• Access controls and site security provided through government control of the NTS, and 
federal land use and environmental stewardship policies. 
  
• Provisions for inspections and maintenance of passive institutional controls, landfill cover, 
and an environmental monitoring system to be included in the post-closure care plan. 
 
• Provisions for detecting and responding to releases, which will also be included in the post-
closure care plan for the 92-Acre Area.   
  
• The monitoring strategy is summarized in the post-closure care plan and adjusted as needed 
through the PA/CA maintenance process.  For the purpose of this discussion, the monitoring 
plan strategy will be presented as a separate assurance requirement item. 
 
• FFACO UGTA land-use restrictions.  (See Appendix VI, Corrective Action Strategy, Rev. 1, 
December 7, 2000, in the January 2007 version of the FFACO [FFACO, 1996]).  
 
The following sections outline the active institutional control strategy with respect to the PA, 
federal land-use policy, long-term stewardship, access and security programs, DOE Orders and 
interagency agreements, post-closure inspection and maintenance provisions, and post-closure 
emergency response plans.  A brief assessment of the potential long-term effectiveness of active 
institutional controls is included.  Institutional controls at the NTS are anticipated to endure 
longer than the 100 years assumed in the GCD PAs. 
5.1 GCD Performance Assessment Institutional Control Assumptions 
The GCD PA modeling was performed with a 100-year institutional control period.  It was 
assumed that during this period, there would be no intrusion into the waste and that no member 
of the public would be allowed near the facility because active institutional controls would be in 
place and effective in the Area 5 RWMS.  The PA assumed the “drilling” and “first homesteader 
6 
 
member of the public” scenarios would take place in the first year after the 100-year institutional 
control period following the closure of the facility.  In addition, the PA took no credit for the 
PICs.  The GCD PA results for the 40 CFR 191 containment and individual protection 
requirements are far below the regulatory limits.  The following provides the assurance that 
active institutional controls will be in place for at least 100 years, post-closure.  
5.2 Land Ownership and Land Use 
Figure 1 shows land ownership in the NTS region.  Most of southern Nevada is federally 
controlled.  The NTS occupies public lands that are administered by the U.S. Department of 
Interior, Bureau of Land Management (BLM).  Public access to the NTS area has been restricted 
since the 1940s, when the land was part of a bombing and gunnery range under the jurisdiction 
of Nellis Air Force Base.  In the 1950s, the U.S. established the area as the primary continental 
location for U.S. nuclear testing.  In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 
withdrew the land that now comprises the NTS under four Public Land Orders.  
 
DOE currently has jurisdiction of the NTS through withdrawals under public land laws, 
including mining and mineral leasing laws through the Public Land Orders, and a memorandum 
of understanding (DOE, 2006). 
 
The NTS Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) (DOE, 1996a) and the Nevada Test Site 
Resource Management Plan (DOE, 1998c) state that a primary mission of the NTS is to 
“. . . preserve the capability to resume underground nuclear testing . . . and accomplish stockpile 
stewardship and national security missions.”  Therefore, it is expected that public access will be 
restricted as long as the NTS is an operational Defense Program facility. 
 
In 1983, the BLM reviewed the four land withdrawals comprising the NTS.  The BLM 
concluded that the lands were still being used for the purposes withdrawn, but recognizing the 
potential end of testing, recommended another review in 100 years (DOE, 2006).  Although the 
agency with jurisdiction over NTS land may change, federal responsibility for the NTS is 
expected to continue in perpetuity.  There are currently no plans to remove institutional controls 
placed on lands within the NTS boundary. 
 
The EIS (DOE, 1996a) defined NTS land uses for planning purposes.  The Area 5 RWMS is a 
designated “Waste Management Site” and is managed through a comprehensive waste 
management program in accordance with pertinent DOE orders, DOE policies, federal 
regulations, and laws.  Closure requirements are designed to help protect future users of the 
property from exposure to the contaminants in the waste. 
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Figure 1.  Land Ownership 
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The Area 5 RWMS is within a Restricted Use Zone defined in local directives.  Activities within 
a Restricted Use Zone must, among other criteria, be “. . . compatible with NTS natural and 
manmade resources . . .” and there must be a “. . . compelling need (such as security, restricted 
access, remote location, physical characteristics) that drives the project to be located within the 
security boundary of the NTS” (DOE, 1998c). 
 
Some of the processes and permits pertinent to land use at the Area 5 RWMS and to ensuring 
waste containment during the period of active control include: 
 
• FFACO land-use restrictions for the UGTA CAU 98 and CAU 111 FFACO sites 
• NTS excavation permits 
• NTS radiological work permits 
• Nevada groundwater well permits 
• National Environmental Protection Act checklist reviews and compliance for planned NTS 
activities 
5.3 Long-Term Stewardship 
The U.S. government’s commitment to the long-term environmental stewardship of the NTS 
while accomplishing agency missions has been stated in many planning and policy documents:  
 
• DOE Policy P 430.1, “Land and Facility Use Planning” (DOE, 1996b)  
• Accelerating Cleanup:  Paths to Closure (DOE, 1998a) 
• Accelerating Cleanup:  Paths to Closure, Nevada Operations Office (DOE, 1998b) 
• From Cleanup to Stewardship (DOE, 1999) 
• Nevada Test Site Resource Management Plan (DOE, 1998c) 
• Performance Management Plan (DOE, 2002) 
• Nevada Test Site, Environmental Management, End State Vision (DOE, 2006) 
 
DOE policy is to manage its “. . . land and facilities as valuable natural resources, with 
stewardship based on principles of ecosystem management and sustainable development . . . .  
The goal of NTS ecosystem management is to accomplish the DOE/NV1 missions of national 
security, EM [Environmental Management], technology diversification, energy efficiency and 
renewable energy, and NTS stewardship while at the same time, sustaining the health and 
biological diversity of NTS ecosystems” (DOE, 1998c).  Furthermore, “DOE will maintain a 
presence at the NTS to ensure reduced risks to human health and the environment.  This long-
term stewardship will include passive and active institutional controls, the degree of which will 
be determined through negotiations between DOE/NV, regulators, Tribal Nations, and 
stakeholders.” (DOE, 1998b) 
 
The NNSA/NSO and DOE contractors at the NTS must comply with DOE Order 450.1, 
“Environmental Protection Program” (DOE, 2003a).  The principle objective of DOE Order 
450.1 is “To implement sound stewardship practices that are protective of the air, water, land,  
and other natural and cultural resources impacted by Department of Energy (DOE) Operations 
and by which DOE cost effectively meets or exceeds compliance with applicable environmental; 
public health; and resource protection laws, regulations and DOE requirements.” (DOE, 2003a)  
 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of  Energy, Nevada Operations Office (prior to Nevada Site Office). 
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The NNSA/NSO Performance Management Plan (DOE, 2002) is compliant with DOE Policy 
P455.1, “Use of Risk-Based End States” (DOE, 2003b).  Expected future land uses are a driver 
in selecting acceptable end-state conditions and cleanup goals for the NTS.  NNSA/NSO EM’s 
land management assumptions and framework for EM activities include:  
 
The NTS will remain under federal control in perpetuity as an NNSA test site, 
and the large buffer zone surrounding the NTS (the Nevada Test and Training 
Range) is assumed to remain under the control of the U.S. Air Force.  There 
are no plans for transfer of any NTS lands to other agencies or public entities.  
Access will continue to be restricted to the NTS and the surrounding areas.  
 
For management purposes, NNSA/NSO EM activities have been established 
based on the source of contamination and type of waste requiring manage-
ment.  Environmental Restoration activities within the State of Nevada fall 
under the purview of a formal regulatory agreement, the Federal Facility 
Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO); Environmental Restoration 
activities outside the State of Nevada fall under the purview of each affected 
State’s regulatory framework but are planned and negotiated with the State 
using the FFACO Corrective Action Strategy framework for applicable 
activities.  Waste Management activities are governed by the Federal Facility 
Compliance Act and Consent Order and the Mutual Consent Agreement.  A 
Joint Low-Level Waste Oversight Agreement is in place to allow State of 
Nevada representatives to participate in review and approval processes 
associated with waste receipt and disposal operations. (DOE, 2002) 
 
The Nevada Test Site, Environmental Management, End State Vision (DOE, 2006) addresses 
contaminated sites controlled by NNSA/NSO EM.  Long-term federal stewardship of the NTS 
underlies the end-state vision.  “The long-term end state vision of the NTS is to restore the 
environment to an extent that will allow the maximum continuation of the national security 
mission conducted by the NNSA/NSO, the national laboratories and contractors.” (DOE, 2006) 
 
DOE criteria for free release of land may result in an extended federal environmental 
stewardship role.  Because of past activities, including both atmospheric and underground 
nuclear weapon tests, some land within the NTS boundary cannot be released for unrestricted use 
without remediation.  It may not be cost-effective to remediate residual contamination from 
underground nuclear testing and long-term land-use restrictions may be required. 
 
DOE (1998b) projects long-term federal stewardship:  “Institutional control of the NTS is 
assumed in perpetuity at the existing boundaries.”  If DOE ceases to exist, it is assumed that 
“. . . another federal agency will become the landlord . . . as institutional control of the site is 
considered an obligation of the federal government and one that is expected to be maintained.” 
 
Although the PA for the GCD TRU boreholes assumes institutional control will last only 
100 years in accordance with 40 CFR 191.14 (a), active federal stewardship of the NTS is 
expected to last longer than 100 years.  Section 5.8 addresses active institutional control 
effectiveness in more detail.  
5.4 Access Control and Security Programs 
Because of its past and anticipated missions of operational readiness and nuclear weapons 
testing, the DOE and the U.S. government have committed to oversight and management of the 
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NTS for the foreseeable future.  The following are the controls in place limiting access to the 
NTS, described in the Nevada Test Site Resource Management Plan (DOE, 1998c): 
 
The NTS is surrounded by government-controlled buffer zones and protected 
by Security Police officers, mobile patrols, and highly trained emergency 
response teams.  Sensitive areas within the NTS use chain-link fencing, 
protective alarms, closed-circuit television, and secure communications 
systems.  The Nye County Sheriff’s Department provides civil law 
enforcement.  
 
The NTS is a controlled-access area with road access beginning at the 
Security Station on Mercury Highway, 5 miles (mi) from the U.S. Highway 
95 Mercury turnoff.  Although a security clearance is not required for entry, 
access is not allowed without proper identification and an identification badge 
[and an appropriate reason for access].  Personnel are issued dosimetry badges 
if entering areas where they might be exposed to radiation levels above 
background.  Security areas within the NTS have stringent personnel controls, 
requiring the appropriate security clearance and an operational need before 
access is allowed.  
 
The entire perimeter of the NTS is not fenced, but it is posted as a restricted 
area; access is prohibited except at designated entrances.  Beyond the 
perimeter, the BLM and Nellis Air Force Range [now Nevada Test and 
Training Range] provide buffer zones.  Barricades and/or Security Stations 
control the few roads that access NTS boundaries.  Perimeter barricades are 
checked by security force patrols. (DOE, 1998c). 
 
Inactive facilities and areas that are known to be contaminated and require 
access control are fenced and posted with warning signs.  In remote areas 
where personnel rarely perform work activities, appropriate posting at the 
perimeter boundary as well as access roads to the contaminated area may be 
substituted instead of fencing. Further program enhancement is accomplished 
by following the Integrated Safety Management guiding principles and core 
functions. (DOE, 1998c) 
5.5 Federal Orders and Interagency Agreements 
The NNSA/NSO has programs to ensure compliance with DOE Order 5400.5, “Radiation 
Protection of the Public and the Environment” that limits annual exposure of the public to 100 
millirem in a year (DOE, 1990).  DOE Order 5400.5 also contains conditions and requirements 
for unrestricted release of land.  Because some of the residual contamination from past nuclear 
tests is likely to be closed in place and will persist for many years, portions of the NTS, such as 
Yucca Flat and Frenchman Flat, may not meet unrestricted release requirements.  Therefore, use 
restrictions may preclude new rural development, mining permits, groundwater wells, and other 
intrusive uses even after DoD and DOE activities cease. 
 
The NNSA/NSO entered into the FFACO in May 1996.  This agreement specifies a process for 
the identification, remediation, and closure of CAUs on the NTS.  The FFACO land-use 
restrictions for CAUs near the Area 5 RWMS are part of the active institutional control strategy 
for the Area 5 RWMS.  Anticipated FFACO land-use restrictions in Frenchman Flat have 
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implications for future public access to the area for drilling water wells, and for the Area 5 
RWMS PA and CA scenario evaluations. 
 
The UGTA CAUs are identified as Restricted Use Zones in local directives (NNSA/NSO, 2006).  
The following section provides an overview of the UGTA program strategy. 
 
The corrective action strategy for UGTA is based on a corrective action process where 
boundaries are identified for each CAU that encompass geographic areas containing groundwater 
that may be unsafe for domestic and municipal use.  Each UGTA CAU will be evaluated through 
data collection, evaluation, and numerical modeling leading to predictions of the maximum 
extent of groundwater flow and contaminant transport from underground testing of nuclear 
weapons.  The vertical and horizontal extent of contaminant migration will be predicted for each 
CAU.  The contaminant boundary will be used to negotiate a compliance boundary between the 
NNSA/NSO and the NDEP.  With establishment of a regulatory compliance boundary, remedial 
actions will be evaluated and a five-year monitoring plan will be developed to assess adequacy 
of CAU surveillance.  If the monitoring plan is found acceptable, a closure plan for the CAU will 
be developed, followed by a long-term closure monitoring program.  
 
It is expected that protection from UGTA contamination regarding human health and the 
environment will be based on controlled access to areas of contamination (areas within the 
UGTA FFACO compliance boundary).  As part of the FFACO process, land-use restriction 
forms and maps are approved by the NDEP and become official records for documenting sites 
with remaining contamination after closure.  The NNSA/NSO, the BLM, and the U.S. Air Force 
will maintain use-restriction records as long as the land is under their jurisdiction and will give 
notice of such restrictions to any successor organizations. 
 
Current results are inconclusive regarding whether the Area 5  will be included in the 
contaminant and compliance boundaries associated with a cluster of underground tests in 
northern Frenchman Flat based on the distribution of UGTA contamination.  The model 
boundaries are expected to be close to the Area 5 site and the Assistant Manager for EM of the 
NNSA/NSO has administratively agreed that the facility will be included within the contaminant 
and compliance boundaries for the Frenchman Flat CAU. 
 
The land-use restrictions will prohibit public access to contaminated groundwater within the 
NDEP compliance-negotiated boundaries for 1,000 years.  Land-use restrictions eliminate 
groundwater drilling as a release pathway and effectively eliminate the “resident homebuilder” 
and the “water drilling inadvertent human intrusion” scenarios from consideration in the PA/CA 
for the Area 5 RWMS. 
5.6 Inspections and Maintenance  
Anticipated inspection and maintenance provisions were outlined in the Integrated Closure and 
Monitoring Plan (ICMP) (BN, 2005).  The final inspection and maintenance strategy will be 
presented in the post-closure care plans for the Area 5 RWMS.  Inspection and maintenance 
requirements for the 92-Acre Area will require compliance with the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements for the closure of the Pit 3 Mixed Waste Disposal Unit.  
The following is extracted primarily from the ICMP. 
 
The inspection program has requirements for environmental monitoring equipment, fire 
protection systems, safety and emergency equipment, security devices, and operating or 
structural equipment that are critical to prevent, detect, or respond to human health or 
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environmental hazards.  Records will be used by RWMS personnel to ensure that inspections are 
conducted according to established schedules. 
 
Inspections will be performed during the institutional control closure period and will consist of 
visual observations of closure cover integrity, fencing, and boundary monuments.  The 
inspection schedule will be determined at closure.  Inspections and associated repairs will ensure 
the continuing protection of human health and the environment.   
 
Post-closure inspection and maintenance will be minimized to the extent possible by the design 
of the disposal unit and closure cover system, and the additional site security measures.  Post-
closure inspections will include: 
 
• General facility inspection 
• Boundary monument inspection  
• Warning sign inspection   
• Cover inspection 
• Run-on/runoff inspection 
 
During each inspection, any changes in the condition of the closure cover, vegetation, or fenced 
area will be documented (40 CFR 265.310[b][1]).  Specific changes noted on the current 
condition of the cover include, but are not limited to, trash and debris within the fenced 
compound, animal burrows or nesting activity, and erosion of the cover. 
 
Maintenance activities will be based on inspection results.  Custodial maintenance or repair 
actions may include repairing fences, replacing warning signs; reestablishing the location control 
monuments, removing unwanted vegetation, and reconstructing slopes, cover, or embankments. 
 
All repair work to the cover will ensure that the integrity of the cover and design “as built” is 
maintained.  For RCRA-regulated disposal units, if cover repair requires modifications of the 
closure cover design, NNSA/NSO will present a formal design modification request to the NDEP 
prior to making the design modification. 
 
Closure and post-closure monitoring documentation will be maintained in the Area 5 RWMS 
files and at the NNSA/NSO Technical Library in North Las Vegas.   
5.7 Emergency Response 
Except for extraordinary events, the site access restrictions, closure cover design, post-closure 
inspections, and preventive maintenance are expected to mitigate the need for emergency release 
response during the active control period.  NTS environmental surveillance and site-specific 
monitoring programs are designed to detect conditions indicating a potential containment breach.  
After detection, further investigation may be necessary to confirm site conditions and to assess 
the scope and nature of the problem.  The type and level of response will depend on the scope 
and nature of the problem and the hazards that must be addressed to implement the response 
safely.  The response may include several phases of activity, including quick containment 
measures and longer-term construction projects.  The NTS has on-site capacity to address many 
types of emergencies rapidly and is likely to maintain such capacity while active DoD and DOE 
operations remain. 
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5.8 Control Effectiveness 
NNSA/NSO evaluated the effectiveness and probable duration of long-term institutional controls 
in Frenchman Flat by convening a panel of independent SMEs (Black et al., 2000).  The SMEs 
unanimously agreed that institutional control would not last for 10,000 years (the elicitation’s 
target compliance period) because no human institution, government, or political civilization has 
lasted for this length of time.  Instead, the SMEs focused on the time frame in which institutional 
control might be lost.  The consensus was that institutional control would be lost within 1,000 
years (90 percent probability), that institutional control has a reasonable chance of lasting about 
250 years (50 percent chance), and that it was very likely to last at least 50 years (90 percent 
chance).  The SMEs also suggested that 2,000 years is the longest period of time for which 
institutional control could reasonably be expected to last.  The SMEs considered a time frame of 
100 to 500 years for institutional control because they expected that it would take this long for 
sociopolitical will to erode sufficiently for institutional control to cease. 
6.0 MONITORING PLAN 
40 CFR 191.14 (b):  Disposal systems shall be monitored after disposal to detect substantial 
and detrimental deviations from expected performance.  This monitoring shall be done with 
techniques that do not jeopardize the isolation of the wastes and shall be conducted until there 
are no significant concerns to be addressed by further monitoring. 
 
An integrated closure and monitoring plan has been developed for the Area 5 RWMS 
(BN, 2005).  This plan addresses monitoring requirements for the multiple regulations applicable 
to the RWMS, including 40 CFR 191.14(b). 
 
The Area 5 RWMS monitoring system consists of a combination of direct monitoring of 
radionuclides released from the disposal system, as well as monitoring transport mechanisms, 
which could lead to the release of radionuclides to the accessible environment.  The monitoring 
system consists of the following elements: 
 
• Vadose zone monitoring 
• Groundwater detection monitoring 
• Radon monitoring 
• Meteorology monitoring 
• Biota monitoring 
• Subsidence monitoring 
• Air monitoring 
• Soil gas at GCD-05U 
 
Current monitoring locations are shown in Figures 2 and 3.  GCD-specific monitoring will be 
described in the post-closure care plan.   
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Figure 2.  Meteorology, Soil Gas, and Vadose Zone Monitoring Stations at the Area 5 RWMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Groundwater Wells, Weighing Lysimeters, Rain Gauge, 
and Other Monitoring Stations Near the Area 5 RWMS 
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The same monolayer-evapotranspirative (ET) cover design using native alluvium and native 
vegetation will be used to close all waste cells within Area 5.  Additionally, extensive 
characterization and monitoring data indicate little spatial variability in the cover and geologic 
materials (NSTec, 2006; Shott et al., 1998).  These factors, coupled with the relatively small 
areal extent of the RWMS, support the position that cover performance monitoring conducted 
within Area 5 is generally applicable to all the Area 5 RWMS regulated waste cells. 
6.1 Vadose Zone Monitoring 
Vadose zone monitoring is conducted to confirm the key assumption of no downward pathway, 
to detect changes in system performance, and to establish baseline data for long-term monitoring.  
The vadose monitoring system consists of weighing lysimeters and instrumented operational 
covers.  Two precision weighing lysimeters have been in continuous operation since 
March 1994.  One lysimeter is vegetated with native plant species at the approximate density of 
the surrounding desert, and the other lysimeter is kept bare to simulate operational covers.  The 
lysimeters are capable of measuring changes in storage of ± 800 grams or ± 0.1 millimeter of 
water.  Additionally, both lysimeter soil columns are instrumented with time domain 
reflectometers (TDRs) for volumetric water content and heat dissipation probes (HDP) for matric 
potential and soil temperature measurements. 
 
Three operational covers and one pit floor are instrumented with TDR probes.  Sensors are 
installed throughout the cover profile to a depth of 180 centimeters.  HDP arrays are also 
installed in two of the operational covers.  Vadose zone sensors are typically read once a day. 
6.2 Groundwater Monitoring 
Since 1993, groundwater monitoring has been conducted for a suite of radiologic and chemical 
constituents at the three wells surrounding the Area 5 RWMS.  The wells have been sampled 
semiannually for RCRA compliance and biennially as part of the sitewide groundwater 
monitoring program.  Water table elevation measurements taken at the three wells surrounding 
the RWMS, as well as neighboring wells, indicate the uppermost aquifer is approximately 235 m 
771 (ft) below ground surface and is essentially flat, with very low rates of groundwater flow. 
6.3 Meteorology Monitoring 
Detailed meteorological data are collected at the Area 5 RWMS.  Measurements include 
precipitation, air temperature, relative humidity, wind speed and direction, barometric pressure, 
and incoming solar radiation.  Hourly data are recorded.  These basic meteorological parameters 
are required to quantify the exchange of water and heat between the soil and atmosphere.  
Meteorological measurements are taken to (1) confirm that the RWMS is sited in an arid 
environment, (2) use as input for process level models, and (3) refine PA/CA parameter 
distributions. 
6.4 Subsidence Monitoring 
Subsidence has been formally monitored since 2000.  Subsidence occurs most commonly in 
recently filled disposal units, especially along the edges where soil backfill may not be 
completely compacted.  Subsidence monitoring ensures that subsidence features are repaired to 
maintain the integrity of the closure cover. 
6.5 Air Monitoring 
Air particulate samples are collected weekly at two stations surrounding the Area 5 RWMS using 
glass fiber filters.  Air particulate samples are screened for gross alpha and gross beta activity 
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weekly.  Monthly composites are analyzed by gamma spectroscopy for gamma-emitting 
radioactivity and by radiochemical analyses for americium and plutonium. 
 
Atmospheric moisture is collected and analyzed for tritium at two stations.  Tritium samples are 
collected over a two-week period.  Tritium acts a conservative tracer and therefore is an excellent 
indicator of volatile radionuclide migration from waste cells. 
6.6 Soil Gas Monitoring 
Soil gas sampling for tritium has been conducted annually at the GCD-05U borehole since 1990.  
GCD-05U has a large tritium inventory (~ 2.2 million curies at time of disposal).  GCD-05U has 
the same approximate geometry and is located near the 40 CFR 191-regulated GCD boreholes 
(GCD-01C, -02C, -03C, and -04C).  GCD-05U therefore is a direct performance analog for the 
40 CFR 191-regulated units and provides data to evaluate the movement of volatile radionuclides 
in a GCD configuration. 
6.7 Biota Monitoring 
Vegetation growing on and around waste disposal units is periodically sampled.  Vegetation 
sampling provides a direct measure of radionuclide transport through plant uptake.  Because of 
its high mobility, tritium is the primary target analyte, although other radionuclides are often 
included in the analysis suite.  Small burrowing animals also are collected periodically and 
analyzed for radionuclides. 
6.8 Radon Flux 
Although significant radon flux is not predicted in the GCD TRU PA, radon flux measurements 
taken at other locations within Area 5 provide supporting data for volatile radionuclide transport 
calculations applicable to GCD. 
6.9 Post-Closure Monitoring 
Monitoring data will be evaluated and compared against PA model assumptions to confirm that 
conceptual and parameter assumptions are not changing on an annual basis.  Included in these 
evaluations will be recommendations for changes in frequency or addition/deletion of monitored 
parameters. 
7.0 ECONOMIC RESOURCE ASSESSMENT 
40 CFR 191(e):  Places where there has been mining for resources, or where there is a 
reasonable expectation of exploration for scarce or easily accessible resources, or where there 
is a significant concentration of any material that is not widely available from other sources, 
should be avoided in selecting disposal sites.  Resources to be considered shall include 
minerals, petroleum or natural gas, valuable geologic formations, and ground waters that are 
either irreplaceable because there is no reasonable alternative source of drinking water 
available for substantial populations or that are vital to the preservation of unique and sensitive 
ecosystems.  Such places shall not be used for disposal of the wastes covered by this part 
unless the favorable characteristics of such places compensate for their greater likelihood of 
being disturbed in the future. 
 
Several assessments show that the Area 5 RWMS was not sited near any significant economic 
mineral deposits, viable petroleum or natural gas deposits, valuable geologic formations, or 
irreplaceable sensitive water supplies.  The Area 5 RWMS is located on an alluvial fan, in an 
arid, remote, alluvium-filled basin, with deep groundwater.  Such alluvial deposits are common 
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and widely distributed in the southern Great Basin.  Biological studies show the Area 5 RWMS 
is not located near unique or sensitive ecosystems. 
 
The NTS continues to be used by the DOE and DoD for a variety of testing and training 
purposes, and federal institutional control of the site is expected to continue to protect the Area 5 
RWMS from intrusive development for many decades. 
7.1 Previous Studies 
NSTec (2007) identified potentially exploitable resources near the Area 5 RWMS that could lead 
to inadvertent human intrusion after active institutional control ends.  Sand and gravel, minerals, 
petroleum, and water were considered.  Quality, quantity, availability of better sources, transport 
costs, and limited local demand are likely to limit commercial extraction of geologic economic 
resources in the NTS region. 
 
NSTec (2007) also reviewed Desert Research Institute’s examination of rural land-use potential 
(Case et al., 1984; Richard-Haggard, 1983) and concluded that “Alternative land uses such as 
agriculture, grazing, and hunting do not appear to be potential causes for inadvertent human 
intrusion.”   
 
Shott et al. (1998) also reviewed references to evaluate the potential for the development of 
geologic resources and agriculture in the region of the Area 5 RWMS.  Detailed information is 
presented in Chapter 2.6, Land Use (Shott et al., 1998). 
 
Although these assessments were quite thorough, NSTec briefly reviewed some of the recent 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and Nevada Bureau of Mines publications available to confirm 
that no new economic mineral resources have been identified near Frenchman Flat. 
 
A few points from these economic resource studies are summarized below to demonstrate that 
the assurance requirement for siting the waste cells away from significant economic resources 
has been fulfilled and that the potential risk of future intrusions into the waste areas for 
development of such resources is very low. 
7.2 Sand and Gravel Resources 
Although there are sands and gravels in the upper alluvium at the Area 5 RWMS, the quality of 
the material is poor and the location is far from the most likely sources of demand for roadways, 
building pads, and other fill structures.  Samples of alluvium from excavations in the Area 5 
RWMS indicate the shallow gravels are composed predominantly of clastic fragments derived 
from the erosion of pyroclastic volcanic rocks.  The alluvium deposits with significant 
percentages of reworked pyroclastic volcanic rocks are too friable to be suitable for many typical 
commercial uses.  Current existing population centers (e.g., Alamo, Beatty, and Pahrump) and 
major highways (e.g., U.S. 95) are far from the Area 5 RWMS.  If development were to occur in 
the Frenchman Flat region in the future, gravel resources are more likely to be extracted from the 
south side of the basin where the material may be higher quality because carbonate rocks are 
more prevalent (NSTec 2007). 
7.3 Mineral Resources 
NSTec (2007)  reviewed the literature and concluded that the Area 5 RWMS  has “a very low 
mineral potential.”  There is no record of historic mining activities within Frenchman Flat.  Four 
mining districts have been identified on the NTS:  Calico Hills, Wahmonie, Mine Mountain, and 
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Oak Spring.  The nearest recorded mineral deposits are 23 kilometers (14 miles) northwest of the 
Area 5 RWMS in the Mine Mountain Mining District. 
 
The economic mineral potential of these districts was summarized by Shott et al. (2000).  Silver 
may be present in the Oak Spring District.  Potentially economic mineral deposits may remain in 
the Wahmonie District.  Commercial tungsten mining occurred in the Oak Spring District in the 
1950s and early 1960s.  The NTS is considered to have a moderate potential for tungsten skarn 
deposits (Science Applications International Corporation/Desert Research Institute, 1991; in 
Shott et al., 2000).  Molybdenum is associated with these deposits. 
 
Although there are natural zeolites in some of the volcanic tuffs underlying Frenchman Flat, the 
likelihood of the vicinity of the Area 5 RWMS being mined for zeolites is very low.  Only 1 of 
the 10 companies that mined natural zeolites in the U.S. in 2005 was located in Nevada, and the 
U.S. produced less than 3 percent of the world production in 2005.  The main domestic uses for 
natural zeolites are for animal feed, water purification, and pet litter (Virta, 2006).  There are 
alternative materials for these products.  Many commercial industrial applications use 
synthesized zeolites for their purity and unique characteristics.  Most U.S. foreign trade in 
zeolites is in synthetic zeolite products (Virta, 2006). 
 
Projections for growth in demand and production of natural zeolites in the U.S. are modest.  New 
products and markets, such as lightweight aggregate for specialty concrete products are in 
development.  Based on recent trends, the USGS predicts U.S. production and sales of natural 
zeolites will increase by at least 4- to 5-percent per year for the next 2 to 3 years (Virta, 2006). 
 
However, natural zeolite resources are not unique to the Frenchman Flat area.  There are existing 
operations in the U.S. extracting higher quality and more accessible material.  Should a local 
market for zeolites ever develop within the NTS (unlikely), the mid-fan location of the Area 5 
RWMS is less likely to be a viable source than volcanic tuffs in alkaline lake deposits.  
7.4 Petroleum Resources 
Petroleum exploration in Nevada has been very limited.  Petroleum had been produced from 
wells in Railroad Valley, approximately 148 km (92 miles) north of the Area 5 RWMS, and in 
Blackburn Field in Eureka County, over  241.4 km (150 miles) north of the Area 5 RWMS.  The 
potential for oil and natural gas is rated low for southern Nye County according to two Nevada 
Bureau of Mines and Geology Reports (Garside et al., 1988; Castor et al., 1990).  Drilled prior to 
1992, four oil and gas exploration holes within 64.3 km (40 miles) of the Area 5 RWMS ranged 
in depth from 447 m (1,468 ft) to 1,702 m (5,583 ft) and were dry holes. 
7.5 Groundwater and Surface Water Supplies 
Pilot wells at the Area 5 RWMS indicate depth to groundwater is about 235 m (772 ft) at 
Ue5PW-1 and 257 m (842 ft) at Ue5PW-2 (BN, 2003).  The water quality monitoring results 
from the pilot wells indicate that the groundwater is good quality in the immediate vicinity of the 
Area 5 RWMS.  These wells tap the uppermost alluvial aquifer, which is not regionally extensive 
and is locally impacted by radionuclides in the vicinity of some nuclear tests that were conducted 
below or near the water table.  Many Corrective Action Sites have been identified in Frenchman 
Flat.  It is anticipated that the Area 5 RWMS will fall within the boundary of a use restriction 
area to be established for the UGTA Frenchman Flat CAU. 
 
19 
 
NSTec (2007) identifies at least three potential uses for groundwater from the aquifer 
(agricultural irrigation, commercial geothermal energy development, and human consumption), 
assuming the aquifer is accessible and there was a sufficient quantity of water.  
 
Future residents (if any) are likely to locate near surface water resources.  The nearest spring is 
Cane Spring, about 9 miles southwest of the Area 5 RWMS.   
7.6 Important Habitats 
Unique and sensitive areas of the NTS have been identified through biological studies.  The 
Area 5 RWMS is not within an area of the NTS identified as “important habitat,” based on high 
species diversity, uniqueness, pristineness, or sensitive habitat that would be slow to recover 
from disturbances (DOE, 1998c).  The vegetative community of the Area 5 RWMS is classified 
as creosote bush/white bursage, a common community within the Mojave Desert. 
 
Large portions of the NTS are within the range of the Western burrowing owl, a bird protected 
by the state of Nevada.  There is no evidence that the Area 5 RWMS operations have affected the 
owls, which often reside in culverts and abandoned conduit pipe.  The Area 5 RWMS is also 
within the range of the desert tortoise, a threatened species protected under the Endangered 
Species Act, but in an area of relative scarcity.  Activities within the tortoise habitat of the NTS 
are conducted in accordance with a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Biological Opinion, which includes 
provisions for surveys, relocations, and mitigation.  The Nevada Test Site Resource Management 
Plan (DOE, 1998c) and annual Nevada Test Site Environmental Reports provide further 
information on monitoring and protection programs for flora, fauna, water supplies, and other 
critical resources of the NTS. 
7.7 Agriculture and Range 
Site conditions do not appear to be favorable for intensive agriculture or ranching.  Shott et al. 
(1998) summarized information on agricultural productivity and agricultural use in southern 
Nevada.  The arid climate, soils, and topography limit productivity.  Most agriculture in southern 
Nevada is for animal feed crops and pasture. 
 
There are irrigable soils in Frenchman Flat, but the soils have poor water-retention 
characteristics.  It is technically feasible to produce hay crops such as alfalfa, but demand for 
irrigable land is low, and only 5 percent of the irrigable land in Nevada is in use  
(Richard-Haggard, 1983).  The cost of infrastructure and power to extract deep irrigation water is 
a factor in agricultural demand.  Southern Nevada farming tends to be located near surface water 
or shallow groundwater supplies.  
 
Shott et al. (1998) cites several evaluations of grazing potential at the NTS.  The general picture 
is that cattle graze selectively on preferred plants.  Only a few of the species of plants in Mojave 
Desert plant communities are suitable for forage.  Populations and productivity of these forage 
shrubs and annual grasses are such that only very low densities of cattle could be supported by 
the plant communities of Frenchman Flat.  Comparison of the average animal unit month for 
BLM grazing permits issued in Nevada to the estimated capacity of the Frenchman Flat area 
suggests the Frenchman Flat area is less productive than average BLM-controlled Nevada 
rangeland.  Accessibility and cost of water is also a factor in range use.  The meager forage and 
deep groundwater of the Area 5 RWMS area may be less attractive to future ranchers than more 
productive areas near springs. 
20 
 
8.0 TRU WASTE RETRIEVAL PLAN 
40 CFR 191.14(f):  Disposal systems shall be selected so that removal of most of the wastes is 
not precluded for a reasonable period of time after disposal. 
 
All of the TRU material in the GCD boreholes is solid material packed in containers.  According 
to Chu and Bernard (1991), the nuclear weapon accident residues in GCD-1C, GCD-2C, and 
GCD-3C were packaged in metal boxes, metal barrels, and plywood boxes coated with 
fiberglass.  Probertite was backfilled around the packages.  The Rocky Flats Plant material in 
GCD-4C was packed in fiberboard containers packed in plastic bags, placed in a rigid drum 
liner, packed in 55-gallon metal drums.  Material from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
in GCD-4C was packed in boxes.  These packages are 21 m (70 ft) to 36 m (120 feet) below 
ground surface and covered by at least 21 m (70 ft) of backfill.  
 
The GCD disposal system does not preclude removal of the waste packages.  Although it would 
be expensive to safely excavate and remove the buried TRU waste at the Area 5 RWMS, it is 
technically feasible.  The NNSA/NSO has maintained a GCD waste retrieval plan since 1992, 
with the most recent update completed in 2007 (DOE, 2007).  The current removal plan assumes 
that contingency costs will be built into the work scope and cost estimate in the event that 
packages are breached in the excavation and grappling process. 
9.0 ENGINEERED AND NATURAL BARRIERS TO ISOLATE THE WASTE 
40 CFR 191.14(d):  Disposal systems shall use different types of barriers to isolate the wastes 
from the accessible environment.  Both engineered and natural barriers shall be included. 
 
In 40 CFR 191.12, the EPA defines the accessible environment as “(1) The atmosphere, (2) land 
surfaces, (3) surface waters, (4) oceans, and (5) all of the lithosphere that is beyond the 
controlled area.”  The EPA defines a barrier as “any material or structure that prevents or  
substantially delays movement of water or radionuclides toward the accessible environment.  For 
example, a barrier may be a geologic structure, a canister, a waste form with physical and 
chemical characteristics that significantly decrease the mobility of radionuclides, or a material 
placed over and around waste, provided that the material or structure substantially delays 
movement of water or radionuclides.”   
 
DOE performance objectives in DOE Order 435.1 include a provision for an exposure limit for 
inadvertent intruders.  Avoidance of intrusions expands the barrier concept to include structures 
and conditions that might help prevent inadvertent human intrusion.  The lack of significant 
economically exploitable natural resources in the region, the cost of drilling and pumping from 
deep wells, and land-use restrictions that prohibit public access to groundwater within 
compliance boundaries to be established for the UGTA Frenchman Flat CAU, will help mitigate 
the risk of inadvertent human intrusions for water drilling and residential agriculture during the 
1,000 year compliance period.   
 
Because the waste packages in the GCD boreholes are buried 21.3 m (70 ft) below ground 
surface, the risk of inadvertently digging into the waste is low.  The waste is also below the 
rooting depth of native plants and the digging depth of native insects and mammals.   
 
The Area 5 RWMS is situated in a remote alluvial basin in the Mojave Desert.  The site 
conditions, including the thick, dry, sandy vadose zone separating the waste cells from the local 
aquifer; the thick volcanic aquitard further separating the waste deposits from the deep regional 
carbonate aquifer; and the arid climate provide an effective natural containment barrier.  The 
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rooting depths of native plants are relatively shallow and efficiently draw infiltrating water from 
the soil.  The proposed final monolayer-ET cover takes advantage of these site conditions.   
 
PA and CA models for the Area 5 RWMS included the effects of erosion, bioturbation, a cooler 
and wetter climate, and other factors in evaluating the effectiveness of containment.  Transport 
models demonstrated there is insufficient vertical transport for contaminants to migrate from the 
GCD borehole waste containers to groundwater.  The median travel time for water to reach 
groundwater under current conditions has been estimated to be 51,000 years (Shott et al., 1998).      
    
Some types of engineered barriers could further reduce the risk of drilling and digging, and some 
types of barriers could also reduce infiltration of storm water and intrusions by burrowing 
animals and insects in near-surface cover fill, which would also help the performance of the 
containment system.  However, because initial calculations and model results demonstrate that 
the natural contaminant barrier and proposed cover are sufficient to meet DOE performance 
objectives, any engineered barrier component would be an extra measure of protection.  
Furthermore, the incorporation of any additional engineered barrier features must be integrated 
with the cover design to ensure that the effectiveness of the cover and adjacent landfill cell 
covers is not significantly compromised.   
 
Final consideration of alternative engineered barriers will be based on identification of the 
transport pathways with maximum release potential, as determined through the PA.  These 
assessments require optimization of the closure-cover design.  Current model results show 
extremely limited to no releases associated with the TRU inventory in the GCD boreholes.  It is 
unlikely that added barriers will provide cost-effective reduction in releases.  Therefore, the 
design of an engineered barrier would be to primarily address the procedural aspects of the 
barrier requirements of 40 CFR 191. 
 
The regulations do not identify the criteria or process for engineered barrier selection and do not 
require technical analysis.  For the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, EPA proposed that DOE select 
barriers using cost-benefit analysis (EPA, 1995).  Therefore, one approach is to assume that the 
best engineered barrier for closure of the GCD boreholes is the most cost-effective barrier that 
complies with 40 CFR 191.   
 
Cost effectiveness of several engineered barrier alternatives was recently evaluated for shallow 
trench T04C (Shott et al., 2007).  T04C is within 150 m (492 ft) of the GCD boreholes and has 
similar environmental and site conditions.  Barriers that prevent or substantially delay upward 
transport and release of radionuclides to land surface by gaseous diffusion, liquid diffusion, 
liquid advection, bioturbation, and human intrusion were ranked for cost-effectiveness using an 
analytical hierarchy process and a multicriteria decisional analysis method.  The performance of 
alternatives was evaluated against a 2.6-m (8.5-ft) operational cover without additional intrusion 
barriers using the 90th and 99.9th percentile of the normalized cumulative release and the member 
of public total effective dose equivalent at 10,000 years.  The most likely exposure scenario was 
assumed to be a member of the public residing at the site boundary who commutes to work 
elsewhere and does not grow food at the residence.  Hydrologic performance and reliability were 
other benefit criteria.   
 
An increase in cover thickness from a 2.6-m  (8.5-ft) operational cover to a 4-m (13-ft) final 
cover was included in several scenarios, for consistency with the current Disposal Authorization 
Statement.  Cover thickness was the most important factor affecting cumulative release at the 
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90th percentile.  At the 99.9th percentile, cover thickness was important for cumulative release but 
a highly effective intruder barrier seemed to add benefit if the cover is at least 4-m (13-ft) thick.   
 
Cost factors included cost of construction, materials, and maintenance; worker safety; and 
compatibility with the cover plans for surrounding closure units.  For T04C, the best cost-benefit 
ratio was obtained for the 4-m (13-ft) monolayer-ET cover.  The second most cost-effective 
barrier was the 4-m (13-ft) monolayer-ET cover combined with a boulder mound surface 
intruder barrier.  However all alternatives including a thinner monolayer-ET cover appear to 
meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1 and 40 CFR 191.  
 
Extrapolating from the T04C special analysis, the relative merits of barrier alternatives can be 
qualitatively evaluated for the GCD boreholes.  Most of the waste containers in the GCD 
boreholes are already buried under 21.3 m (70 ft) of native alluvium.  It is assumed that the 
incremental benefits of a thicker final cover are small compared to the performance of the 
existing 21.3 m (70 ft) of cover.  The base case is a monolayer-ET cover, at least 1.3 m (4.25 ft) 
above the ground elevation, integrated with the existing operational cover on the low-level mixed 
waste unit (LLMWU).  Table 1 qualitatively describes the relative benefits and costs of several 
barrier alternatives.   
Table 1.  Engineered Barriers Comparison 
Alternative Engineered Barrier Description 
(all barriers are above the 21.3-m (70 ft) native 
fill operational cover) 
Relative 
Cost 
Human Intrusion 
Reduction Benefit 
1 Monolayer ET Cover (Contiguous with LLMWU 
Cover)  
Lowest Lowest 
2 Asphalt Barrier (asphalt geotextile or geosynthetic 
clay liner above asphalt concrete layer)  
Moderately 
high 
Negligible 
3 Capillary Break Layer  Moderate Negligible 
4 1.1 m (3.6 ft) Revegetation Layer over 9-m (30-ft) 
Waste Rubber Tire Layer  
High Fair 
5 1.1 m  (3.6 ft) Revegetation Layer over 9-m (30-ft) 
Bailing Wire Layer  
High Fair 
6 1.1 m (3.6 ft) Revegetation Layer over 1.5 m (5 ft) 
Reinforced Concrete Layer  
Highest Good 
7 Boulder Field on Monolayer Cover Contiguous with 
LLMWU ET Cover 
Low Good 
8 3-m (10 ft)  Boulder Wall Surrounding GCD Units 
on Monolayer ET Cover Contiguous with LLMWU 
ET Cover 
Low Good 
9 Boulder Mounds on GCD Units on Monolayer 
Cover Contiguous with LLMWU ET Cover  
Low Best 
 
This assessment assumes cumulative release is far more sensitive to human intrusions (e.g., 
drilling boreholes) than movement of radionuclides by bioturbation and water/vapor transport.  
Comparison of the cost of constructing and maintaining a barrier compared to the increased 
human-intrusion prevention benefits suggest a boulder mound over each GCD borehole may cost 
effectively marginally reduce the risk of drilling into the GCD wastes.  The risk reduction is 
above and beyond the significant risk-reduction benefits of the remote site location, the lack of 
economically exploitable natural resources, the significant cost to develop groundwater, and 
institutional controls after closure of the GCD units.   
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The strategy for meeting the engineered barrier assurance requirement is being evaluated by 
NNSA/NSO in the context of the design and optimization of the closure cover.  The details of 
any proposed engineered barrier will be incorporated in the Closure Plan for the GCD boreholes. 
10.0 CONCLUSIONS 
The measures outlined above fulfill five of the assurance requirements of 40 CFR 191.14 with 
respect to the GCD boreholes containing TRU: 
 
• Passive institutional controls 
• Active institutional controls 
• Monitoring plan 
• Economic resource assessment 
• TRU waste retrieval plan 
 
The effectiveness of the natural containment barriers was previously demonstrated through the 
PA process.  The strategy for meeting the engineered barrier assurance requirement is being 
evaluated by NNSA/NSO in the context of the design and optimization of the closure cover.  The 
incorporation of any additional engineered barrier features must be integrated with the cover 
design.  PA/CA and special analysis data suggest a monolayer ET cover integrated with the final 
cover of the LLMWU will meet the assurance requirements for an engineered barrier.  An 
additional surface structure such as a boulder mound may be considered for marginal intrusion 
prevention benefits, but is not necessary in order to comply with the assurance requirements.  
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